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MEDICAL RESIDENT STIPENDS:
EXCLUSION FROM INCOME AS
"SCHOLARSHIPS" OR
"FELLOWSHIPS"
Mizell v. United States'
In the past, many medical residents have failed in their attempts to
avoid inclusion of their stipend payments in gross income by treating them
as scholarships or fellowships.2 A recent decision by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, creates new hope for
medical residents in their quest to escape taxation. The case also points up
the need for the United States Supreme Court to decide the status of medi-
cal resident payments as a matter of law in order to avoid varied decisions
in cases with virtually identical facts.
In Mizell v. United States,3 the plaintiff taxpayers served in non-degree
residency programs in the Departments of Medicine, Anesthesiology, and
Dermatology at the University of Missouri-Columbia Medical Center,
where they were to obtain the necessary training and prerequisites for
board certification in their areas of specialization.4 The plaintiffs received
stipend payments from the University,' a portion of which they excluded
from gross income on their tax returns for the years 1972, 1973, and 1974.6
1. 663 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1981).
2. See cases cited note 13 infra.
3. 663 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1981).
4. Id at 773. In addition, residents performed identical services for the Veter-
ans Administration Hospital. Brief for Appellee at 13, Mizell. The major purpose
of the residency program is to provide residents with the opportunity to diagnose a
patient's condition and initiate proper treatment. In the first year of the program,
residents spend at least eleven months providing primary patient care. During that
period, they engage in a wide range of patient care activities, including interviewing
incoming patients, performing physical examinations, recording patient histories,
providing follow-up care, treating patients on a continuing basis in the out-patient
clinic, and providing medical care in the emergency room. In the second year,
residents spend only five or six months performing these functions; the remainder of
the year is spent diagnosing patients in the ten major subspecialties of internal
medicine. Residents usually spend one hundred hours a week at the hospital. They
are part of a team that works a 24-hour shift every third day as well as on specified
weekends. In addition to the treatment given to a particular patient at the hospital,
residents generally continue treating that patient in the out-patient clinic. Brief for
Appellant at 6-7, Mizell.
5. 663 F.2d at 773.
6. Plaintiffs could not exclude all of their stipends because they were certifi-
cate, not degree, candidates. Id Certificate candidates cannot exclude more than
$3,600 per year for three years. I.R.C. § 117(b)(2) (1976).
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The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) asserted that the excluded stipend pay-
ments were not excludable "scholarships" or "fellowships" within the
meaning of section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code7 and assessed addi-
tional taxes.' The plaintiffs paid the additional taxes and, upon subsequent
denial of their claims for refunds by the IRS, filed an action in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. A jury found
that the stipends were scholarships or fellowships, not taxable compensa-
tion.9 The IRS appealed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court,
holding that the jury decision was supported by substantial evidence.' °
A great many cases under section 117 have involved medical residents
seeking to exclude their stipends on the theory that the work they do for
hospitals is educational, not occupational, and that stipends are therefore
not compensation for services rendered." The vast majority of these deci-
sions have gone against the residents,' 2 the courts holding that monies re-
ceived while working at hospitals are compensation for services and fully
taxable." The decision in Mizell thus creates a breakthrough for medical
residents.
Section 117 states generally that scholarships and fellowships should
not be included in a taxpayer's gross income. 4 In determining what consti-
tutes a scholarship or fellowship, courts use the definitions set out in the
Treasury Regulations. 5 Scholarships are amounts paid or allowed to a
7. I.R.C. § 117 (1976).
8. 663 F.2d at 773.
9. Id
10. Id The court found that on the facts presented, there was substantial evi-
dence that the stipends were scholarships or fellowships.
11. See, e.g., Rockswold v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D. Minn.
1979), afd, 620 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980).
12. In holding against the residents, courts reason that interns and residents
normally are considered employees of the hospitals in which they work and are paid
in exchange for the extensive and valuable medical services they render. Id
13. See, e.g., Rockswold v. United States, 620 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980); Parr v.
United States, 469 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1972); Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d
1262 (4th Cir. 1972); Quast v. United States, 428 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1970); Woddail
v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Wertzberger v. United States, 315
F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1970), afdper curiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1971); Bur-
stein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 63
T.C. 454 (1975); Fisher v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1201 (1971); Rev. Rul. 57-386,
1957-2 C.B. 107. But see Leathers v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Ark.
1971),aj'd, 471 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); Bieberdorf
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 114 (1973); Bailey v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 447 (1973);
Rev. Rul. 57-560, 1957-2 C.B. 108.
14. I.R.C. § 117(a) (1976). See also id § 61(a) (definition of gross income).
15. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117 (1956). Courts use this regulation in conjunction
with § 117 to determine whether a resident's stipend can be excluded from gross
income. The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the regulation, noting that
"the definitions supplied by the Regulation clearly are prima facie proper, comport-
1983]
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student at an educational institution to aid in pursuit of study, 6 while fel-
lowships are amounts paid or allowed to an individual to aid in the pursuit
of study or research. 7
Once payments are characterized as scholarships or fellowships, they
are subject to certain limitations. Section 117 itself places two limitations: 8
the grantor of the scholarship or fellowship must be a tax-exempt organiza-
tion,' 9 and the amount excluded cannot exceed $3,600 per year for three
years.2" The IRS imposes two additional limitations: amounts paid must
not represent compensation for past, present, or future employment serv-
ices, 2 and study or research performed by the recipients must not be pri-
marily for the benefit of the grantor. 22
Recognizing these limitations, the test that courts generally apply in
determining whether amounts received are scholarships or fellowships is
whether the amounts paid are "relatively disinterested 'no-strings' educa-
tional grants, with no requirement of any substantial quidpro quo from the
recipients. '2'  Scholarship or fellowship recipients can meet this test by
showing that the "primary purpose of the studies or research is to further
the education and training of the recipient in his individual capacity and
the amount provided by the grantor for such purposes does not represent
compensation or payment for the services."
24
It is well settled in the Eighth Circuit25 and elsewhere 26 that the ulti-
mate question of whether a payment is excludable as a scholarship or fel-
lowship under section 117 is a question of fact. In Miell, the jury acted as
the finder of fact and determined that the stipends received by the taxpay-
ers were excludable to the extent allowed under section 117.27 In only one
ing as they do with the ordinary understanding of 'scholarships' and 'fellowships' as
relatively disinterested, 'no-strings' educational grants, with no requirement of any
substantial quidpro quo from the recipients." Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751
(1969).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1956).
17. Id § 1.117-3(c).
18. Medical residents are considered to be non-degree candidates and therefore
are subject to these limitations. 663 F.2d at 773.
19. I.R.C. § 117(b)(2)(A) (1976). See also id § 501(c)(3) (definition of "tax ex-
empt organization").
20. Id § 117(b)(2)(B).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(1) (1956).
22. Id § 1.117-4(c)(2).
23. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751 (1969).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c)(2) (1956).
25. See, e.g., Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721, 723-24 (10th Cir. 1963);
Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582, 586-87 (5th Cir. 1961).
27. 663 F.2d at 773.
[Vol. 48
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other Eighth Circuit decision, Leathers v. United States,28 had the fact
finder-a jury-found in favor of the taxpayers. The taxpayers lost in all
other decisions involving such stipend payments in that circuit.2 9 With one
exception, 30 the decision of the fact finder, whether judge or jury, has never
been overturned in any of the reported cases involving this problem."1
The main factor in determining the tax status of a medical resident's
stipend is the "primary purpose" of the payment.3 2 To be excludable, the
28. 352 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Ark. 1971), af'd, 471 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). The taxpayers in Leathers were licensed physicians in
the residency program at the University of Arkansas Medical Center. Evidence
showed that (1) the clear purpose of the Center was to train physicians, (2) the
stipend appointments did not require any rendering of services, (3) the stipends
were made for the support of the doctors, (4) yearly increases were based on need
rather than services rendered, (5) the hospital could function without the aid of the
residents, and (6) there was no requirement that the residents remain with the hos-
pital after residency. From these facts, the jury inferred that the monies paid were
not compensation for services rendered. 471 F.2d at 857, 861. See also Note, Taxa-
tion: The Section 117 Exclusion and Medical Residents-To Exclude or Not to Exclude, 27
OKLA. L. REV. 115, 118-21 (1974).
29. See, e.g., Rockswold v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Minn. 1979)
(judge), affd, 620 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980); Wertzberger v. United States, 315 F.
Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (judge), af'dper curiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1971);
Quast v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 56 (D. Minn. 1968) (jury), aj'd, 428 F.2d 750
(8th Cir. 1970).
30. In Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972), the court re-
versed the district court jury verdict and held the residents' stipends includable in
gross income because the lower court had erroneously applied the "primary pur-
pose" test to thefaciliy rather than to thepayment to the resident. Id at 1264. See
note 32 infra.
31. 471 F.2d at 864 n.3. The fact finder may be judge orjury; the taxpayer has
a choice. He may either refuse to pay the additional tax and seek a deficiency
review in the Tax Court, where he will get a judge, or pay the tax and sue for a
refund in district court, where he can get a jury. In determining which avenue to
follow, the taxpayer must remember that:
[a] jury verdict is subject to a more restricted review on appeal than a
single judge's finding of fact. A trial judge's finding may be set aside if it is
"clearly erroneous." . . . This means that although there exists substan-
tial evidence to support the finding, if the court of appeals possesses a firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed, it may still reverse. ...
On the other hand, a jury verdict may not be set aside where substantial
evidence exists notwithstanding the court of appeals disagreement with it.
Id As the results of Mizell and Leathers indicate, a medical resident increases his
chances of winning if he brings his case before a jury in district court.
32. This test is derived from Treas. Reg. § 1.117-(4)(c)(2) (1956), which states
that payments made primarily for the benefit of the grantor will not be considered a
scholarship or fellowship grant. See Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 870
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d
1262, 1264 (4th Cir. 1972). The test, as applied to residency stipends, has under-
1983]
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss1/13
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
primary purpose must be to further the education and training of the recip-
ient, not to compensate him for services rendered.3 3 If the primary purpose
is to compensate or reward the recipient for any past, present, or future
services, no exclusion will be allowed under section 117."4 The Miell court,
in support of the jury's determination, found the payments to be relatively
disinterested because (1) they were designed to defray the taxpayers' living
expenses; (2) they were based on the reasonable amount of necessary living
expenses in the community; and (3) they were not in any way conditioned
upon job performance or the number of patients treated. 5 In contrast,
however, the Eighth Circuit in three other cases, Rockswold v. United States,36
Wertzberger v. United States," and Quasi v. United States,38 all of which had
similar facts, affirmed district court determinations that the stipends were
paid to residents as compensation for their services as resident physicians
and were therefore fully taxable.
39
Such inconsistency within the Eighth Circuit is attributable to the rela-
tive emphasis that fact finders have placed on various factors. The only
situation in which medical resident stipends unquestionably are excludable
gone a subtle shift in focus. Courts no longer look at the primary purpose of the
institution, but rather to the primary purpose of the payment. The primary func-
tion of a hospital as an exclusively teaching facility no longer is sufficient to support
a claim that a stipend is a relatively disinterested educational grant with no require-
ment of a substantial quid pro quo. See Tucker, FederalIncome Taxation of Scholarshibs
and Fellowships: A Practical Analysis, 8 IND. L. REv. 749, 786 (1975).
33. See Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529, 535 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
34. Id
35. 663 F.2d at 776.
36. 620 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs in Rockswold were "medical
fellows" at the University of Minnesota. Most of their duties were the same as those
performed by residents. Unlike residents, however, medical fellows were required to
do a considerable amount of independent research and their regimen was much
more academically oriented. The amount of their stipend payments was not based
on need but increased automatically as a fellow progressed through the program.
Id at 167-68.
37. 315 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1970), afdper curiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.
1971). The plaintiffs in Wertzberger were resident physicians in the Department of
Surgery at the University of Kansas Medical Center. Services performed by the
residents were subject to constant direction, supervision, and control by the hospital
staff. Stipends received were not based on financial need and taxes were deducted
from the gross amount. Residents also received fringe benefits and could negotiate
to get increases in the amount of stipend received. Id at 35-36.
38. 428 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1970). The plaintiff in Quasi was a "career resident"
at the University of Minnesota Hospital. He was required to work at the hospital
for a two-year period after his three-year residency at the hospital's option. The
plaintiff signed an employment contract and received a much larger stipend than a
regular resident. Id at 753.
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from gross income is when the recipient performs no services for the gran-
tor, has no taxes withheld, receives no fringe benefits, performs without di-
rect supervision,40 and has no present or future obligation to work for the
grantor.4 ' Otherwise, whether such a stipend payment is excludable will
depend on the weight and interpretation of the following factors:
1. whether the services performed by the resident were necessary
and indispensable to the operation of the hospital;
42
2. whether the recipient has been provided a number of the
fringe benefits customarily received by employees;
43
3. whether the resident has signed an employment contract and
performs substantial services for the hospital; 44
4. the degree of supervision over the resident;
45
5. whether the hospital is engaged primarily in research and
teaching or patient care;
46
40. Various courts treat the degree of supervision factor differently. The Miell
court considered a high degree of supervision to be a factor in favor of exclusion
because it resulted in duplication of patient care services, making the residents'
work of no benefit to the hospital. 663 F.2d at 776. On the other hand, the court in
Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529, 536-37 (Ct. Cl. 1980), considered that su-
pervision and control of the activities of a resident was characteristic of compensa-
ble services in that it was evidence of an employment relationship and that such
close supervision increased the value of the services to the employer.
41. See Krupin v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 440, 445 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
42. If services are necessary and indispensable, stipends usually are held includ-
able in gross income. See Meek v. United States, 608 F.2d 368, 373 (9th Cir. 1979)
(residents performed services that must otherwise have been performed by others);
Hembree v. United States, 464 F.2d 1262, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1972) (valuable services
provided by residents were indicia of employment relationship); Wertzberger v.
United States, 315 F. Supp. 34, 35 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (residents rendered valuable
services resulting in benefit to hospital), afl'dper curim, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir.
1971).
43. Receipt of normal incidental benefits is a factor that weighs against exclu-
sion from gross income. See Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 861 (8th Cir.
1972) (free laundry service, free health and malpractice insurance, paid vacations),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); Quast v. United States, 428 F.2d 750, 752 (8th Cir.
1972) (paid vacation, sick leave, group health and life insurance, coverage under
Federal Employment Retirement Act); Wertzberger v. United States, 315 F. Supp.
34, 36 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (monthly meal tickets, uniforms, laundry services, paid
vacation, hospitalization coverage, medical care for residents and their families,
malpractice insurance, free parking), af'dper cuiiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1971).
44. Existence of an employment contract is evidence of an employment rela-
tionship. Stipends received under such a contract usually are held includable in
gross income. See Quast v. United States, 428 F.2d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 1970) (resi-
dent entered into "Contract for Full-Time Physicians"); Woddail v. Commissioner,
321 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir. 1963) (contract stated resident would be "full-time
physician").
45. Courts treat this factor in conflicting ways. See note 40 supra.
46. In the past, if a hospital was engaged primarily in research and teaching,
1983]
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6. whether there is a requirement to stay with the hospital after
completion of the residency program;4 7
7. whether the hospital could have performed the same services
without the resident;48
8. whether there were payroll deductions made from the stipend
payments;49 and
9. whether the resident received payroll increases on the basis of
need or tenure.
50
stipends could be held excludable, whereas if the primary purpose was patient care,
stipends usually were held includable in gross income. See, e.g., Leathers v. United
States, 471 F.2d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 1972) (hospital strictly teaching institution, pri-
mary purposes education and training of physicians), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932
(1973); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir. 1963) (primary pur-
pose of hospital was care and treatment of patients). Today, however, this factor is
not given as much weight as it once enjoyed. See note 32 supra.
47. A requirement to stay with the hospital after completion of the residency
renders the stipend includable in gross income. See Quast v. United States, 428
F.2d 750, 753 (8th Cir. 1970) (resident required to stay with hospital for two years
after residency); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir. 1963) (resi-
dent obligated to remain in employment specified time for each year of residency
training). Cf. Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 1972) (no re-
quirement that resident remain with hospital after completion of residency), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973).
48. Some courts consider the ability of the hospital to operate without the resi-
dents as a factor in favor of exclusion from gross income. See Mizell v. United
States, 663 F.2d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 1981); Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856,
862 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). Not all courts agree. "Even if
the Center could do without residents, it did not do without them; it used their
services, and it paid for them. Many employees may be dispensable in the sense
that their employer could 'operate' without them. But such dispensability hardly
renders their salaries noncompensatory." Fisher v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1201,
1215 (1971).
49. Payroll deductions are evidence that stipends are compensation and there-
fore includable in gross income, but courts do not apply much weight to this factor.
See Quast v. United States, 428 F.2d 750, 752 (8th Cir. 1970) (federal income taxes
withheld from stipend); Woddail v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721, 724 (10th Cir.
1963) (same); Wertzberger v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 34, 36 (W.D. Mo. 1970)
(federal income taxes and social security contributions withheld from stipend), a/I'd
per curiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1971).
50. Stipend increases based on tenure often indicate that a payment is in the
nature of compensation. See Wertzberger v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 34, 36
(W.D. Mo. 1970) (amount paid to resident increased over years of residency and
was reflected as "Salary Changes" on "Change of Employment Status" report), afd
per curiam, 441 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1971); Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529,
538 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (amounts received based on tenure, not academic standing or
financial need). Cf Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1972)
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The Mizell court placed great emphasis on the evidence presented in
support of the partial excludability of the stipends.5 1 There was evidence
that the stipend payments were designed to allow residents to meet living
expenses and were not conditioned upon job performance; that although
residents performed substantial services for the hospital, their work was su-
pervised by the medical school faculty, duplicated by attending staff physi-
cians, and not required for the operation of the hospital; and that there was
no obligation to work for the hospital upon completion of the residency
program.
5 2
The court recognized, however, that the IRS had presented evidence
that would indicate that the stipends were compensation,5 3 including the
deduction of taxes from the stipends;54 annual increases in payments based
on tenure and not financial need;5 5 and availability to the residents of an
extensive fringe benefit package.5" Despite this evidence, the court affirmed
the jury's verdict. Noting that the verdict must be upheld unless reasonable
minds, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the taxpayers,
could not have found for them,5 7 the court decided that the verdict was
supported by substantial evidence.
5 8
The holding in Mizell, when compared with the decisions in Leathers,
Rockswold, Wertzberger, and Quast, makes it virtually impossible for medical
residents to know without litigation whether they must pay taxes on sti-
pends paid to them by the institutions where they train. The cases show
that juries as well as judges can reach contrary conclusions in cases with
virtually identical facts. Something should be done to resolve this
51. 663 F.2d at 777.
52. Id at 776-77.
53. Id at 777.
54. Although the withholding of federal taxes is indicative of compensation, see
note 49 supra, the Mizell court found that the University's bookkeeping practices did
not indicate the true nature of the payments. The University applied the same
treatment to other clearly excludable payments made to purely academic research-
ers in order to avoid federal income tax disputes. 663 F.2d at 776.
55. 663 F.2d at 777. See note 50 supra.
56. The taxpayers in Mizell received group medical insurance, group life insur-
ance, accidental death and dismemberment insurance, sick leave benefits, vacation
benefits, free meals while on extended duty, laundry services, and malpractice in-
surance. Brief for Appellant at 9, Mizell. See note 43 supra.
57. 663 F.2d at 777. See also Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91
(1960); McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 158 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978).
58. 663 F.2d at 776. See also Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856, 858 (8th
Cir. 1972) (court "will not reverse a jury's determination of a fact question where
such determination is supported by substantial evidence" and will not "substitute
[its] judgment for that of the finder of facts, whether it be judge or jury"), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973); note 31 supra.
1983]
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Because the issue in Mizell was a question of fact, the decision is not
binding as a matter of law.' The decision illustrates, however, that unless
the Supreme Court hands down a definitive ruling, the factual question of
whether medical residents' stipends are to be excluded will continue to be
decided on a case-by-case basis using the factors mentioned above.6 1 It
seems evident, therefore, that although Mizell reopened the doors for possi-
ble excludability of such stipends, medical residents will still not be able to
determine the tax status of their stipends without litigation. The expense of
such litigation suggests strongly that the Supreme Court "resolve, as a mat-
ter of law, the tax liability on stipends paid to resident physicians., 62
JEFFREY J. CoMo'rro
59. The need for a solution to the problem was articulated by Judge Bright, the
dissenting judge in Leathers, in his dissent from the order denying a rehearing en
banc in MiZell:
In the absence of a definite ruling by the Supreme Court, this court should
take the responsibility of adopting an appropriate legal test for tax liabil-
ity in cases such as this. . . . Residency programs do not differ greatly
among hospitals. Yet residents may or may not pay taxes on identical
types of stipends depending on jury determinations. . . . This court
should take this opportunity to eliminate the confusion in ascertaining tax
consequences caused by Leathers and the decision in the instant appeal.
We should resolve, as a matter of law, the tax liability on stipends paid to
resident physicians.
Mizell v. United States, 669 F.2d 552, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1982) (Bright, J., dissenting).
60. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290-91 (1968). If there is
fear of undue uncertainty or excessive litigation, Congress could forestall many dis-
putes by singling out certain factors and making them determinative of the matter.
Id
61. See notes 42-50 and accompanying text supra.
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